Since the 1990’s, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) have become one of the most influential actors in the water politics of Africa. For instance, in Kenya from 1996 to 2003, the number of registered NGOs grew explosively, from 511 to over 2,500 total organizations (Hearn, 2007). Also, estimates now show that NGOs may be supplying more capital into African infrastructure development projects than the World Bank (Mohan, 2002). Given I have not addressed them yet, this final blog post seems like a good opportunity to discuss their effectiveness in influencing water infrastructure development across Africa.

A key important aspect of how NGOs are intended to operate is in their name: they are non-governmental. This deliberate separation of organisation from state allows them to remain detached from the agendas of developed countries. However, they are widely criticized for how they have become increasingly politicized as they seek funding which often ties them to donors with western agendas. For instance, although the primary goal of development NGOs is to positively influence the promotion of economic development, Gosh, 2009 asserts that their credibility is hampered by how they are accountable to their donors and not their beneficiaries. Thus, there arise conflicts of interest where donors may levy their position to insist on certain projects versus others that may not necessarily be in the best interests of a community.

Zakiya, 2014 describes this complex relationship as “philanthrocapitalism” where wealthy angel investors link their funds through NGOs into the developing world under the mask of corporate responsibility. This creates the problem of “quantiphilia” where NGOs are not just interested in helping communities grow and expand their water infrastructure, networks and economy, but they are fixated on measurable results to report, leading to a system where data and algorithms may hold more input to water investment allocation than the input of local political actors. This issue is amplified by the distances between donors from the water consumers, removing influential decision-makers from the reality of the field, shown below.

Figure 1: Path From International NGO To Water Provision, Rusca and Schwartz, 2012

However, the fact that local peoples have significantly greater understanding of the local ecology and water needs in their community is not lost on NGOs. They are typically efficient in utilising indigenous knowledge to improve the overall efficiency of water development projects. NGOs tend to be advocates of endogenous development as well, where the water project is designed to meet the local criteria and needs of the community, and they are responsible for the project to build a sense of identity with it. Mixing these two together allows for a project to be “by the people, for the people” and creates community solidarity and cooperation in a project. However, some academics are concerned that, similar to reservations that IWRM is becoming simply a “prescription” pill to issue to local communities on water management (Giordano and Shah, 2013), the use of indigenous knowledge and endogenous development may become just another “development fad” used by NGOs while still serving western interests (Fernando, 2003).

Reading through articles and literature on NGO project outcomes, I noticed most optimistic reports come from dialogue created by NGOs and critical reports come from scientific literature. Rusca and Schwartz, 2012 paints a picture of how WaterAid, one of the largest NGOs in water development, implements projects via a case study of two programs in Lilongwe and Maputo. In both cases, the objectives involved creating a centralized water management system and the implementation of a tariff collecting system. In both cases, projects were successful in expanding water access networks in both cities, but two concerning trends were noted: 1) the billing system was concerningly high, representing on average 9% of the minimum wage per month, with projects only built in targeted areas with high ability-to-pay, and 2) although sustainability was initially claimed as a primary goal, “relevant aspects for long-term sustainability, such as technical and operational aspects of water services, were neglected” (Rusca and Schwartz, 2012). The authors note that the issue with high water tariffs results from the results-oriented structure WaterAid is subject to in donor reporting, whereas the sustainability concerns arose from weak integration of the local political structures to gain consent on the scope of the project and ensure community participation.

However, not all literature is critical of NGOs and their outcomes in water projects. Bratton, 1989 asserts that in measuring how successful NGOs are in their goals, it must be done objectively and empirically, and success measurements must be checked by monitoring the NGO. He also comments on how most positive reports are generated internally by NGOs but agrees that evidence defends how assistance from NGOs has been shown to improve certain necessary health services, such as sanitation and water access. Moreover, it appears that NGOs can also be more effective in addressing water issues in Africa due to the motivation of field staffs, who often care greatly for the project outcome and people it affects.  

I don’t intend to overly criticize NGOs. They have placed more funds into developing the water provisioning systems of Africa than almost any other community. They rely on dedicated staff who truly care to help the people they serve, and outcomes are often successful. However, akin to my commentary on the World Bank, there arises considerable structural concerns that degrade their ability to fully address water development. This tends to reflect what may be the greatest issue of development in Africa: western assistance there needs to avoid looking for quantifiable results or investment opportunities, and simply allow Africa to develop on its own terms while providing knowhow and assistance with the process.

In this blog post, I’ve decided to break down a bilateral treaty between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa. These two states have been working cooperatively over the last 30 years on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (“LHWP”), a system of dams and hydropower that distributes water from the mountains of Lesotho into South Africa, creating hydroelectricity for Lesotho along the way.

It is important to note why the project has been such a success in meeting its intended goals. First, it stands as an example of successful bilateral cooperation between two countries as it relates to their various water rights and needs. Lesotho is not a large country and does not have the same water requirements as the large, dry South Africa. The area of South Africa that the LHWP serves, the Vaal Region, is of utmost economic importance to the region, as it constitutes 40% of the GDP of South Africa, and was becoming subject to a water crunch, projected to expand from a water deficit of 1.83 cubic meters per second in 1995 to 107 cubic meters per second in 2030 (Boadu, 1998). The project benefits Lesotho in turn by boosting the economy: the water project currently comprises 25% of the country’s annual export revenues and 14% of its government revenues over the following 50 years (Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, 2009). The hydroelectricity generated also comprises nearly all of the electricity requirements of Lesotho each year.

Figure 1: Katse Dam, the First Phase (IA) of the LHWP, Climate Home News, 2016

The negotiation of the agreement has been appraised for being particularly successful in maintaining equity via the negotiations of the project. The agreement could have been strongly one-sided in favour of South Africa. Similar to how Zeitoun and Warner, 2005 notes that water distribution of transboundary resources can have significantly unfair distributions in favour of a country with greater political clout, in this instance South Africa could have exercised significant political pressure to force Lesotho to comply with terms that were inequitable. Boadu, 1998 notes the two parties to the agreement were successful in negotiating a mutually beneficial treaty in two ways: “(1) by incorporating and building on the historical commonalities between the two countries rather than a costly search for new sources of trust and (2) by a joint undertaking to share the information cost for all the technical and non-technical aspects of the treaty.” Thus, the two countries decided to build upon positive historical relationships rather than attempt to swing the negotiations using power politics.

By negotiating in a way that takes overall equity into consideration, the project exemplifies how countries in Africa can develop cooperatively. When Mohale Dam, the second dam built under the LHWP, was inaugurated, South African president Thabo Mbeki declared:

"This project sparkles like a jewel in the crown of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union, proving that we can, as Africans, accomplish sustainable development, to the mutual benefit of neighbouring countries and as an example of projects that are needed all over our continent to achieve our renaissance" (Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, 2004). 

South Africa could have taken an approach similar to the way that Egypt and Sudan handled provisioning of the water of the Nile. Most of the water used in these dams that tribute to water in South Africa originate in Lesotho, just as most of the tributaries to the Nile originate in Ethiopia. However, South Africa understood the important of cooperative development, and agreed to negotiate terms equitably.

However, any project that seems to fix so many problems, like providing new water resources to South Africa while generating energy and revenues for Lesotho, cannot be perfect. The greatest controversy of the project has been the overall relocation of many locals in Lesotho to develop the land for the dam structures. Hitchcock, 2015 assesses that approximately 573 families and another 20,000 people were indirectly affected by the first two stages of the LHWP. For the most part, this involved relocations to upland areas that are less agriculturally productive, and many of those relocated “become at least partially dependent on food relief and other livelihood supports provided by international relief agencies, state governments, and civil society.”

 Figure 1: Families Displaced During Phase 1A and 1B of LHWP, Hitchcock, 2015

Academics are also critical that, although the project has significant beneficial macroeconomic benefits for the country in aggregate, the local benefits are mostly distributed amongst the country’s elite (Hoover, 2001). The wealthier classes of the country do not tend to live in rural areas that could be subject to relocation, and have secured for themselves contract related to the project, so as to benefit from the surge of cash made available. Moreover, many decisions regarding the project have ignored community input and gone on without local participation, in order to minimize local political pushback. However, this has only garnered greater protest from the larger political scene, most notably from interest groups looking to influence public opinion against the LHWP (Meissner, 2016). 

However, many people have benefited from the LHWP as well. The project has brought life to the economy of Lesotho and improved the lives of many locals, as additional capital has allowed for investments in other aspects of the country’s infrastructure. One anecdote from a local claims that, although many people had to relocate,

"In general, life has changed, living standards have gone up, the highland people now have access to high-quality education, health facilities, clean water, and good roads,        - Mahlape Mothepu (Keketso, 2003).

So, like any other large infrastructural project related to water, the LHWP has generated significant costs and benefits for Lesotho and South Africa. Although the project could do better in garnering local political support, it has been notably successful as an example of bilateral transboundary water resource management.